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For  alternative  sharing  arrangements  we review  theory  on  the  economic 
effects  on  employment,  productivity,  investment,  income  and wealth 
distribution,  and life  cycle  and  survival.  We find  that  predictions  are  often 
ambiguous  and  that  sometimes  the  nature  and  size  of  the  specific  effect  is 
determined  in  part  by  the  particular  institutional  arrangements.  Next  recent 
econometric  work  is  studied.  We review  studies  using  aggregate  and  industry 
level  time  series  data  for  Japan  as  well  as  studies  that  use  enterprise  and 
establishment  level  data  for  firms  in  North  America  and  Western  Europe.  Worker 
participation,  employee  share  ownership  and  profit  sharing  schemes  are  often 
found  to  affect  the  economic  performance  of  firms.  For  some issues,  however, 
we  sometimes  find  that  studies  obtained  conflicting  results.  However,  the 
available  evidence  is  strongly  suggestive  that  for  employee  ownership  schemes 
to  have  a  strong  positive  impact  they  need  to  be  accompanied  by  provision  for 
uorker  participation  in  decision  making. I.  INTRODUCTION 
Recently,  there  has  been  considerable  attention  given  by  economists,  labor 
relations  specialists,  policy  makers,  and  the  media  to  alternative  forms  of 
business  organization  and  of  workers’  remuneration.  In  part,  this  reflects  the 
disappointing  macroeconomic  performance  of  industrial  nations  during  the  past 
decade  and  a  perception  that  many industries  were  losing  their  ability  to 
compete  with  foreign  firms.  The  failure  of  these  economies  to  attain  full 
employment with  stable  prices  has  stimulated  interest  in  alternative  labor 
compensation  schemes  that  would  link  part  of  employee  compensation  to  the 
performance  of  the  firm,  thereby  improving  worker  productivity  and  the  firm’s 
competitiveness.  These  alternative  compensation  schemes  include  profit  and 
value  added  sharing,  employee  share  ownership,  and  productivity  gainsharing. 
Concern  about  the  competitiveness  of  domestic  firms  has  also  increased  interest 
in  various  forms  of  worker  participation  in  decision-making  such  as  quality 
circles,  labor  management  committees,  worker  councils,  and worker  directors. 
The various  proposed  reforms  of  labor  compensation  systems  and  business 
organization  would  expand  employee  participation  in  at  least  one  of  three 
dimensions:  surplus  (profits),  ownership,  and  decision-making.  Unfortunately, 
economic  theory  typically  yields  conflicting  predictions  of  the  effects  of 
greater  participation  on  important  variables  such  as  employment,  productivity, 
and  investment.  In  addition,  theory  does  not  unambiguously  indicate  if 
simultaneous  changes  in  two  or  more  dimensions  would  be  reinforcing  or 
offsetting. 
In  light  of  the  failure  of  economic  theory  to  provide  policy  makers  with 
clear  guidance,  we will  survey  some of  the  recent  empirical  work  on  the 
1 economic  effects  of  a  few  alternatives  to  conventional  firms.1  The  first  is 
profit  and  value  added  sharing,  which  has  been  the  focus  of  much research  in 
recent  years  because  of  the  work  of  Martin  Weitzman  (1983,  1984,  1985,  1986, 
1988).  Weitzman claims  that  unemployment  will  be  lower  and macroeconomic 
shocks  will  produce  smaller  employment  fluctuations  in  a  profit  sharing  system 
than  in  a  conventional  fixed  wage  system.  Weitzman’s  ideas  have  attracted 
interest  among policy  makers  and  the  media  as  well  as  among academics.  In 
1987,  the  British  government  granted  tax  relief  to  encourage  firms  to  adopt 
profit  related  pay.  In  the  United  States,  the  New York  Times  (1985)  praised 
Weitzman’s  proposed  idea  for  a  share  economy  and  argued  that  it  “deserves 
attraction  and debate.” 
An alternative  form  of  financial  participation  is  employee  share  ownership 
schemes.  In  these  plans,  workers  are  given  or  are  able  to  purchase  cheaply 
shares  of  the  firm  in  which  they  work,  and  typically  do  not  exercise  much 
influence  over  the  enterprise’s  operations.  Most  employee  stock  ownership 
schemes  (ESOPs) in  the  U.S.  are  of  this  form.)  U.S.  ESOPs  have  attracted  much 
attention  recently  and by  1986  about  7500  ESOPs covered  about  7,500,OOO 
workers.  In  Canada,  employee  share  ownership  schemes  have  been  introduced  at  a 
very  rapid  rate  over  the  past  few  years  (Toronto  Stock  Exchange  (1987)). 
Moreover,  this  “phenomenal growth”  was  not  supported  by  the  sort  of  tax 
incentives  available  to  U.S.  ESOPs.  As  we will  discuss  below,  the  economic 
effects  of  these  schemes might  differ  from  those  of  cash-based  profit  sharing. 
The  third  alternative  that  we will  review  is  producer  (industrial/worker) 
cooperatives  (PCs).  In  these  firms,  employees  participate  in  profits, 
ownership,  and decision-making.  One reason  to  include  these  firms  in  the 
survey  is  the  growing  body  of  empirical  work on  the  effects  on  (total  factor) 
2 productivity  in  PCs of  various  forms  of  financial  sharing  and participation  in 
decision  making.  This  literature  might  help  to  identify  which  forms  of 
participation  are  likely  to  have  favorable  effects.  Like  other  forms  of 
sharing,  PCs have  grown rapidly  in  recent  years  and  Sibille  (1983)  estimates 
employment in  western  European  PCs at  about  half  a  million. 
This  paper  is  organized  as  follows.  In  section  2,  we sketch  some  of  the 
theoretical  arguments on  the  economic  effects  of  alternative  sharing 
arrangements.  The existing  econometric  literature  on  these  effects  is 
partially  surveyed  in  the  third  section.  Finally,  we offer  a  few  concluding 
comments. 
II.  THEORETICAL  BACKGROUND 
In  this  section  we outline  some  theoretical  arguments  on  the  economic 
effects  of  alternative  sharing  arrangements  on  the  economic  performance  of  the 
firm.  Our review  will  be  brief  because  in  general  economic  theory  does  not 
provide  unambiguous conclusions.  We will  focus  on  five  main measures  of 
performance  --  employment,  productivity,  investment,  income  and  wealth 
distribution  and  life  cycle  and  survival  --  because  they  are  the  variables 
around  which  most  policy  discussions  center.  Although  some might  argue  that 
the  most  important  reason  to  adopt  reforms  that  increase  worker  participation 
is  that  it  will  promote  the  growth  of  economic  democracy,  this  sort  of 
ideological  discussion  is  beyond  the  scope  of  this  paper. 
We first  consider  the  effects  of  profit  sharing  on  the  level  and  the 
variability  of  employment.  There  are  three  arguments  for  profit  sharing  (see 
Blanchflower  and Oswald  (1987a)  and  Estrin,  Grout  and  Wadhwani (1987)).  The 
first,  which  is  traditional,  is  that  profit  sharing  increases  productivity  by 
inducing  changes  in  workers’  attitudes  toward  the  firm.  Although  this 
3 productivity  argument  is  not  derived  from  a  formal  model,  the  presumption  is 
that  profit  sharing  improves  morale,  thereby  increasing  effort  and  reducing 
absenteeism  and  labor  turnover.  (However,  Jensen  and  Heckling  (3.919)  dispute 
the  claim  that  profit  sharing  enhances  productivity.  See  below.)  The  lower 
turnover  rate  would  reduce  training  costs  and  might  be  associated  with  more 
firm-specific  human capital  investments.  If  profit  sharing  raises  the  marginal 
and  average  product  of  labor  at  each  level  of  employment,  then  a  profit  sharing 
firm  will  employ  more workers  at  a  given  level  of  pay  than  a  conventional  fixed 
wage  firm  (Bradley  and  Estrin  (1987)).  However,  the  higher  average  product  of 
labor  implies  that  a  profit  sharing  firm  will,  other  things  equal,  employ  fewer 
workers  at  a  given  level  of  output. 
The  second  traditional  argument  is  that  remuneration  would  be  more  flexible 
under  profit  sharing.  Thus,  compensation  would  respond  more  quickly  to 
unanticipated  aggregate  demand or  aggregate  supply  shocks  under  profit  sharing 
than  under  a  fixed  wage  system  in  which  wages  are  set  by  long-term  contracts. 
This  in  turn  implies  that  a  profit  sharing  firm  should  exhibit  less  employment 
variability. 
The  third  argument  is  one  that  is  due  to  Weitzman.  Weitzman considers  a 
“share  economy”  in  which  most  or  all  firms  have  adopted  profit  sharing  and 
contrasts  this  economy  to  one  populated  by  conventional  firms.  The  key  element 
in  Weitzman’s  case  for  a  profit  sharing  system  is  that  such  a  system  would 
likely  be  characterized  by  an  excess  demand for  labor.  In  contrast,  the 
conventional  fixed  wage economy  would  likely  experience  excess  labor  supply  or 
labor  market  clearing.  In  a  share  economy  in  which  firms  compensate  workers 
with  both  a  base  wage  and  a  share  of  profits,  labor  shortages  may arise  because 
firms  will  want  to  hire  workers  to  equate  the  value  of  the  marginal  product  of 
a labor  to  the  base  wage  (the  marginal  cost  of  labor)  rather  than  to  total 
remuneration.  If  the  base  wage  is  set  sufficiently  low,  demand for  labor  would 
exceed  the  available  supply,  which  is  determined  by  total  remuneration.  One 
implication  of  an  excess  demand for  labor  is  that  a  negative  aggregate  demand 
shock  would  increase  unemployment by  a  smaller  amount than  under  a  fixed  wage 
system. 
Weitzman’s  theoretical  case  for  profit  sharing  has  been  criticized  for  its 
sensitivity  to  a  number of  its  assumptions,  especially  those  related  to  whether 
the  base  wage or  total  remuneration  is  the  marginal  cost  of  labor  and  to  how 
the  firm  and  its  employees  bargain  (for  example,  see  Estrin  and  Wilson  (19861, 
Blanchflower  and Oswald  (1987a),  and  Estrin,  Grout  and  Wadhwani (1987)).  If 
firms  view  total  remuneration  as  the  marginal  cost  of  labor  perhaps  because  of 
tight  labor  markets,  Weitzman’s  employment effects  will  not  arise.  In 
addition,  it  has  been  argued  that  profit  sharing  may not  raise  employment 
levels  if  the  firm  does  not  have  exclusive  control  over  the  level  of  employment 
perhaps  because  of  the  role  of  unions  (see  Tracy  (1986)  for  a  simple 
illustrative  model).  Weitzman assumes  that  the  firm  controls  the  employment 
decision  and he  (Weitzman,  1986)  is  critical  of  labor-managed  firms  because 
existing  members make  the  hiring  decisions. 
An additional  argument against  Weitzman’s  share  economy  is  that  it  would 
depress  investment  because  the  owners  of  firms  would  have  less  incentive  to 
invest  when workers  share  some of  the  profits  arising  from  investments  (for 
example,  see  Beade  (1986) 1.  However,  Weitzman  (1986)  argues  that  investment 
might  be  higher  in  a  profit  sharing  system  than  in  a  fixed  wage system.  One 
reason  for  Weitzman’s  favorable  outlook  is  that  output  will  be  stabilized  near 
the  full-capacity  level. 
5 In  contrast  to  the  positive  effects  on  employment  that  some researchers 
expect  for  profit  sharing,  the  standard  model  of  a  labor-  managed firm  implies 
that  employment will  be  lower  in  worker  cooperatives  than  in  conventional  firms 
(Benin  and Putterman  (1986112.  The  key  feature  of  the  model  underlying  this 
outcome  is  that  the  objective  of  the  worker  coop  is  to  maximize  income  per 
worker  rather  than  total  profits.  Members of  worker  cooperatives  have  an 
incentive  to  restrict  employment  to  avoid  diluting  their  share  of  the  firm’s 
profits. 
The  argument that  productivity  would  be  higher  in  a  worker  cooperative  than 
in  a  conventional  firm  is  similar  to  the  one  given  above  for  profit  sharing. 
However,  worker  participation  in  decision-making  might  be  a  source  of  an 
additional  improvement:  workers  in  participatory  firms  might  exhibit  more 
cooperative  behavior  which  would  reduce  the  costs  of  monitoring  a  worker’s 
effort  (Fitzroy  and Kraft  (19873)).  Thus,  financial  sharing  and  worker 
participation  in  decision-making  might  have  reinforcing  effects  on 
productivity. 
The opposing  view  is  given  in  Jensen  and  Meckling  (19791,  who argue  that 
the  cost  of  monitoring  workers  increases  with  the  degree  of  worker 
participation  in  decision-making:  the  more monitors,  the  higher  the  cost. 
Horeover,  if  workers  share  in  the  firm’s  profits,  managers will  have  a  greater 
incentive  to  shirk  their  monitoring  function.  Thus,  Jensen  and  Meckling 
predict  that  productivity  will  be  lower  in  participatory  firms. 
The dominant view  is  that  labor-managed  firms  will  underinvest  (see,  for 
example,  Vanek  (19751,  and  Furubotn  and  Pejovich  (1970)).  The  main  argument  is 
that  members of  labor-managed  firms  are  unable  to  recover  their  share  of 
retained  earnings  because  some  of  these  earnings  become part  of  the  collective 
6 reserves.  Thus,  members require  a  higher  than  normal  return  on  investment 
projects,  which  implies  some  profitable  projects  are  not  undertaken. 
The  employment and productivity  effects  of  employee  share  ownershi?  schemes 
is  expected  to  depend upon  the  type  of  scheme  (Estrin,  Grout,  and Wadhnani 
(1987)).  For  example,  the  effect  should  be  similar  to  that  obtained  under 
profit  sharing  if  employees  receive  shares  whose  value  is  determined  by  the 
firm’s  profits.  However,  if  workers’  share  of  the  firm’s  equity  becomes 
sufficiently  large,  then  our  discussion  of  worker  cooperatives  becomes 
relevant. 
The  fourth  area  of  interest,  and  one  for  which  little  detailed  work  has  yet 
been  completed,  is  income  and  wealth  distribution.  Various  ad  hoc  arguments 
have  been  presented  as  to  why there  might  be  higher  distributive  efficiency 
both  within  individual  firms  with  sharing  arrangements  and  among firms  within  a 
sector  of  sharing  firms  (Vanek  (1970).  Also,  much of  the  impetus  behind  the 
ESOP legislation  in  the  U.S.  is  the  stated  intent  of  its  proponents  to  make the 
distribution  of  wealth  in  the  U.S.  less  unequal  via  a  strategy  of  encouraging 
capital  accumulation  by  individual  employees. 
The  final  area  of  interest  is  whether  or  not  the  life  cycle  for  and 
survival  potential  of  sharing  firms  differs  systematically  both  among firms 
with  differing  share  arrangements  and  also  compared  with  capitalist  firms. 
Here  the  economic  theory  is  best  developed  for  the  labor-managed  firm.  While 
most  authors  have  expounded  theories  which  imply  that  all  labor-managed  firms 
will  display  a  life  cycle,  they  disagree  over  the  underlying  determinants  and 
ultimate  consequences  of  the  degeneration  process.  Some analysts  stress  both 
the  structure  of  ownership  and  capital  formation  (see  Vanek  (19751,  while 
others  point  to  the  use  of  hired  labor  (see  Miyazaki  (1984)  or  Ben-Ner 
7 (1984)).  But  there  is  almost  general  agreement  among economic  theorists  that 
labor-managed  firms  will  either  fail  as  productive  units  in  the  long  term  or 
convert  into  another  form  of  enterprise.3  While  this  theoretical  pessimism 
as  to  the  survival  potential  of  labor-managed  firms  will  not  necessarily  carry 
over  to  theories  dealing  with  other  forms  of  sharing,  it  does,  at  least, 
provide  pause  for  concern. 
In  summary, the  predictions  yielded  by  economic  theory  are  often 
ambiguous.  In  some cases,  the  direction  of  an  effect  is  determined  by 
particular  institutional  arrangements  of  the  scheme.  Also,  the  size  of  an 
effect  of  one  share  arrangement  may depend  upon  the  nature  and  the  extent  of 
other  forms  of  participation. 
III.  EMPIRICAL  EVIDENCE 
This  survey  of  empirical  work  on  the  economic  effects  of  alternative 
sharing  arrangements  will  be  limited  to  recent  econometric  studies.4  We will 
begin  with  evidence  for  aggregate  and  industry  level  time  series  data  for 
Japan,  which  reflects  the  importance  of  the  Japanese  bonus  system.  Bonuses 
have  accounted  for  as  much as  25% of  Japanese  workers’  pay  and  have  exhibited  a 
large  cyclical  component.  Thus,  the  Japanese  economy has  some  features  of 
Veitzman’s  share  economy.  The rest  of  this  section  will  summarize work  that 
used  enterprise  and establishment  level  data  for  firms  in  the  United  Kingdom, 
West  Germany, the  United  States,  France,  and  Italy. 
Freeman and Ueitzman  (1987,  p.  189)  conclude  that  the  Japanese  bonus  system 
is  partly  responsible  for  “the  success  of  the  Japanese  economy by  automatically 
helping  to  stabilize  unemployment at  relatively  low  levels.”  Most  of  the 
results  reported  in  their  paper  were  based  on  macroeconomic  time  series  data 
and  one  digit  industry  level  data  for  the  1958-83  period.  Their  principal 
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greater  degree  than  wages  and  that  employment  varies  inversely  with  the  base 
wage  and  positively  with  the  bonus.  ‘fhis  second  finding  was obtained  from 
estimated  employment equations  in  which  the  natural  logarithm  of  employment  is 
a  function  of  the  real  wage rate,  the  real  bonus  per  worker,  real  output  (as  a 
measure  of  demand) and other  variables.  Freeman and  Weitzman interpret  the 
second  finding  as  providing  some support  for  one  aspect  of  the  share  economy: 
the  base  wage is  the  firm’s  marginal  cost  of  labor. 
Wadhwani (1987)  and Estrin,  Grout,  and  Wadhwani (1987)  argue  that  the 
Japanese  data  do  not  support  Weitzman’s  claims  for  a  profit  sharing  system. 
For  example,  Wadhwani  finds  that  the  proportion  of  firms  that  experience  labor 
shortages  was  lower  for  Japan  than  for  four  European  nations  between  1976-83, 
which  contradicts  Weitzman’s  prediction  that  a  share  economy is  likely  to  be 
characterized  by  an excess  demand for  labor.  In  addition,  he  finds  that  the 
variability  of  the  deviation  of  Japanese  output  from  measures  of  potential 
output  generally  exceeded  the  variability  of  the  deviation  for  most  industrial 
nations.  This  does  not  suggest  that  the  bonus  system  has  stabilized  the 
Japanese  economy.  Estrin,  Grout,  and Wadhwani observe  that  a  conventional 
neoclassical  labor  demand model  specifies  that  employment is  a  function  of  the 
capital  stock  rather  than  output.  When they  modify  Freeman and  Weitzman’s 
employment  equation  by  replacing  output  with  the  capital  stock,  their  estimated 
employment  equation  is  consistent  with  employment  depending  only  on  total 
remuneration,  which is  contrary  to  Weitzman’s  assumption  that  the  base  wage  is 
the  marginal  cost  of  labor.  However,  one  might  be  reluctant  to  place  too  much 
emphasis  on  Estrin,  Grout  and Wadhwani’s  result  because  both  the  coefficient  on 
the  (real)  wage and the  coefficient  on  the  ratio  of  the  bonus  to  the  wage  are 
9 positive;  however,  neither  is  statistically  significant  at  conventional 
levels.  Still,  one  cannot  be  confident  that  the  superior  macroeconomic 
performance  of  the  Japanese  economy  is  attributable  to  its  bonus  system  and 
that  the  Japanese  data  support  Weitzman’s  claims  for  a  share  economy. 
The  evidence  obtained  from  enterprise  level  data  on  the  employment  effects 
of  profit  sharing  is  also  inconclusive.  Two  recent  studies  of  British  firms  -- 
Estrin  and  Wilson  (1986)  and  Bradley  and  Estrin  (1987)  found  that  profit 
sharing  increased  the  level  of  employment.  Estrin  and  Wilson  used  a  short 
panel  data  set  of  52  firms  in  the  engineering  and  metal  working  sectors  over 
1978-82,  a  period  when  the  British  economy  was  in  a  deep  recession,  to  estimate 
employment  and  remuneration  equations.  They  used  a  dummy  variable  to  indicate 
if  the  firm  had  either  a  profit  sharing  or  a  value  added  cash  bonus  scheme. 
The  coefficient  on  the  dummy  variable  in  their  estimated  employment  equation 
indicated  that  profit  and  value  added  sharing  increased  employment  by  12% after 
controlling  for  the  capital  stock,  total  remuneration,  product  market  power, 
aggregate  and  industry  demand,  and  the  skill  structure  of  the  labor  force.  In 
addition,  profit  sharing  lowered  remuneration  by  4%,  which  caused  an  additional 
1% rise  in  employment. 
Bradley  and  Estrin  (1987)  investigated  the  effects  of  profit  sharing  on  the 
level  of  employment  using  data  on  the  John  Lewis  Partnership,  a  worker  owned 
firm  which  the  authors  argued  behaved  as  if  it  were  a  conventional  profit 
maximizing  firm  that  distributed  a  share  of  its  profits  as  an  employee  bonus, 
and  its  four  main  competitors  in  the  retail  sector.  Their  sample  period  was 
1970-1985.  An  employment  equation  was  estimated  with  four  firm  specific  dummy 
variables  for  the  four  competitors  to  capture  the  effects  of  profit  sharing. 
The  estimated  coefficients  of  these  dummy  variables  indicated  that  employment 
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after  controlling  for  remuneration,  sales,  and  retail  sales.  Bradley  and 
Es’irin  also  report  the  results  of  estimating  equations  that  explain  the  rate  of 
change  in  employment in  terms  of  the  rate  of  change  of  remuneration,  sales,  and 
retail  sales  as  well  as  the  four  firm  specific  dummy  variables.  Since  none  of 
the  dummy  variables  was individually  significant,  the  authors  state  that  one 
cannot  claim  that  profit  sharing  affects  the  rate  of  change  of  employment. 
However,  their  equation  did  not  allow  them to  examine  if  employment at  John 
Lewis  exhibits  less  responsiveness  to  demand shocks  than  employment at  its 
competitors.  Finally,  they  estimate  an  employment  equation  using  only  data  for 
John  Lewis  in  which  (the  natural  logarithm  of)  total  remuneration  is  decomposed 
into  the  (natural  logarithm  of  the)  base  wage  and  the  ratio  of  the  bonus  to  the 
base  wage.  They find  some evidence  that  employment  is  affected  differently  by 
the  base  wage and by  the  bonus,  which  is  a  necessary  outcome  for  the  sort  of 
behavior  Weitzman predicts  for  firms  in  the  share  economy. 
The  British  profit  sharing  firms  in  the  Estrin  and  Wilson  and  the  Bradley 
and  Estrin  samples  distributed  profits  as  a  cash  bonus.  In  contrast, 
Blanchflower  and Oswald  (1987b)  investigated  the  employment effects  of  employee 
share  ownership  schemes.  Blanchflower  and  Oswald  used  survey  data  (the  1980 
Workplace  Industrial  Relations  Survey  --  WIRS) for  637  establishments  in  the 
British  manufacturing  sector.  A dummy  variable  indicated  if  the  enterprise  had 
an  employee  share  ownership  scheme  in  which  workers  receive  or  can  purchase 
cheaply  shares  of  the  firm.  Data  were  not  available  on  cash-based  profit 
sharing.  Unlike  the  previous  two  papers,  Blanchflower  and Oswald find  that 
employee  share  ownership  did  not  have  a  statistically  significant  effect  on 
either  the  level  of  employment or  the  responsiveness  of  employment to  firm 
11 specific  demand shocks.  However,  one  should  view  these  results  with  some 
caution  because  as  Blanchflower  and  Oswald  acknowledge,  they  lack  data  on 
remuneration  and have only  qualitative  measures  of  the  level  of  and  the  change 
in  demand for  each  firm’s  products. 
A second  study  that  lacked  information  on  cash-based  sharing  is  Kruse 
(1987)  who used  a  panel  data  set  of  1491  American  firms  over  the  1971-1985 
period  to  investigate  the  effects  of  profit  sharing  on  the  variability  of 
employment.  Profit  sharing  data  were  limited  to  profit  sharing  pension  plans; 
no  data  were  available  on  cash-only  plans.  Two  (alternative)  measures  of 
profit  sharing  were used  --  a  dummy  variable  and  the  percent  of  employees 
covered.  Kruse  found  that  the  response  of  employment  to  changes  in  the 
(national)  civilian  unemployment rate  was  lower  for  profit  sharing  firms  and 
for  some specifications  significantly  so  for  firms  in  the  manufacturing 
sector.  These  results  support  Weitzman’s  claim  that  profit  sharing  stabilizes 
employment.  Horeover,  his  finding  that  data  for  manufacturing  firms  yielded 
stronger  evidence  for  Weitzman’s  claim  than  the  non-manufacturing  firm  data  is 
what  one  would  expect. 
Except  for  Kruse’s  use  of  the  percent  of  employees  covered  by  profit 
sharing  pension  plans,  the  studies  based  on  enterprise  level  data  reviewed  so 
far  have  attempted  to  estimate  the  employment  effects  of  profit  sharing  by 
comparing  profit  sharing  and  conventional  firms  while  simultaneously 
controlling  for  other  effects  (e.g.,  remuneration)  on  employment.  The  use  of  a 
continuous  measure of  the  importance  of  profit  sharing  rather  than  a  dummy 
variable  for  the  existence  of  a  scheme  would  allow  researchers  to  attempt  to 
exploit  variations  in  the  extent  of  profit  sharing  by  the  sharing  firms  in 
their  sample.  Jones  and Pliskin  (1989)  constructed  a  continuous  measure  of 
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sensitivity  of  their  results  to  the  choice  of  how  profit  sharing  was  measured. 
In  addition,  they  investigated  if  the  effects  of  profit  sharing  depended  on  the 
degree  of  worker  participation  in  decision-making  (which  was  proxied  by  two 
alternative  measures  --  the  proportion  of  workers  who  were  members  of  the  PCs 
in  the  sample  and  the  proportion  of  the  board  of  directors  who  were  workers). 
Their  sample  consisted  of  panel  data  on  127  British  firms5  in  the  printing, 
footwear,  and  clothing  industries  that  were  characterized  by  a  variety  of 
sharing  arrangements  including  firms  completely  controlled  by  their  workers 
(producer  cooperatives),  profit  sharing  firms,  and  firms  with  no  share  features 
at  all.  Although  some  of  the  firms  that  had  a  profit  sharing  scheme  distributed 
the  bonus  entirely  in  the  form  of  cash,  many  distributed  profits  as  shares. 
(Data  were  not  available  to  identify  which  firms  had  cash-based  profit 
sharing.  1 
The  authors’  principal  finding  was  that  the  employment  effect  of  profit 
sharing  is  dependent  upon  the  way  in  which  profit  sharing  is  measured,  how 
employment  is  specified  to  respond  to  past  as  well  as  current  values  of  its 
determinants,  and  whether  or  not  measures  of  employee  participation  in  decision 
making  are  included  in  the  employment  equation.  In  general,  the  estimated 
effect  of  profit  sharing  on  employment  was  negative  and  significant  when  profit 
sharing  was  represented  by  a  dummy variable.  A  positive  and  significant  effect 
was  sometimes  found  when  the  continuous  measure  of  profit  sharing  was  used. 
However,  the  results  obtained  from  models  which  used  a  dummy variable  were  in 
most  instances  implausibly  large  if  one  takes  into  account  both  the  direct 
effect  represented  by  the  coefficient  on  the  dummy variable  and  the  indirect 
effect  arising  from  the  lagged  value  of  employment.  Since  it  is  not  clear  that 
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differences,  one  should  not  conclude  that  the  results  based  on  this  variable 
are  correct.  However,  it  does  suggest  that  the  findings  of  other  studies  that 
used  a  dummy  variable  might  be  less  than  definitive.  Their  results  on  the 
effect  of  including  a  measure  of  worker  participation  in  decision  making 
illustrates  that  the  impact  of  a  particular  sharing  scheme  may have  different 
effects  in  different  organizational  structures.6  Two alternative  measures  of 
worker  participation  were  used:  the  proportion  of  the  members of  the  Board  who 
are  workers  and the  proportion  of  the  workforce  who are  members of  the  producer 
cooperatives  in  their  sample.  Both  the  sign  and  the  magnitude  of  the  effect  of 
worker  participation  on  the  employment effect  of  profit  sharing  varied  across 
specifications. 
Finally,  for  a  typical  profit  sharing  firm  in-their  data  set,  when their 
continuous  measure of  profit  sharing  was used,  the  estimated  employment effects 
typically  ranged  from  -6%  to  +6%.  These  effects  are  much more  modest  than 
those  obtained  by  Bradley  and  Estrin  (1987)  and  by  Estrin  and  Wilson  (1986). 
One partial  explanation  for  the  difference  between  Jones  and  Pliskin’s  results 
and  those  obtained  by  Bradley  and  Estrin  is  that  the  bonus  paid  by  the  John 
Lewis  Partnership  accounted  for  a  larger  fraction  of  workers’  income  than  is 
true  for  a  typical  firm  in  the  Jones  and Pliskin  sample.  This  is  not  a 
possible  explanation  for  the  Estrin  and Wilson  result.  The  bonus  paid  by  a 
typical  firm  in  Estrin  and  Wilson  sample  is  around  3% of  average  pay  which  is 
similar  to  the  practice  of  firms  in  the  Jones  and  Pliskin  sample.  An 
additional  reason  why Estrin  and  Wilson  and  Bradley  and  Estrin  obtained  larger 
estimated  effects  is  that  they  studied  cash-based  profit  sharing  while  most  of 
the  firms  in  the  Jones  and  Pliskin  study  distributed  the  bonus  in  the  form  of 
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Other  available  empirical  evidence  on  the  employment  and wage effects  of 
varieties  of  the  share  economy  for  the  U.S.  is  very  slim  and does  not  yet 
provide  definitive  results.  So  far  as  ESOPs  and  ESPPs are  concerned,  much of 
the  available  evidence  is  concerned  with  the  job  saving  impact  of  employee 
buyouts.  Various  studies  (e.g.,  Logue  et  al  (1986))  point  to  the  low  failure 
rate  of  firms  in  distress  that  had  adopted  employee  ownership.  Then there  are 
conspicuous  success  stories,  e.g.,  the  0  & 0  supermarkets  in  Philadelphia 
(Granrose,  et  al.  (1986)).  While  clearly  there  is  a  correlation  between  jobs 
saved  and  employee  ownership,  the  context  within  which  buyouts  emerge, 
(involving  a  gamut of  changes  that  seldom  are  controlled  for  in  the  available 
studies),  means that  it  is  premature  to  conclude  from  these  studies  that  it  is 
ownership  per  se  that  is  the  dominant  force  at  work  in  these  cases. 
Similar  problems  beset  most  other  studies,  even  those  that  ostensibly  have 
more  controls.  An example  is  Rosen  and  Klein  (1983)  who use  data  gathered  from 
a  survey  of  individual  firms  with  ESOPs to  compare  average  annual  increases  in 
employment with  industry  averages.  For  the  43  firms  responding  they  find  an 
average  annual  increase  in  employment  in  firms  with  ESOPs  that  was about  three 
times  the  relevant  industry  average.  In  a  later  study  under  the  aegis  of  the 
same organization  that  sponsored  the  study  by  Rosen  and  Klein,  (namely  the 
Rational  Centre  for  Employee Ownership),  Quarrey  (1986)  compares  the  employment 
growth  of  each  of  55  ESOP  companies  with  292  non-ESOP companies.  He finds  that 
a  statistically  significant  difference  with  ESOPs  growing  6.5  percentage  points 
faster  than 
compare  the 
of  the  ESOP 
non-ESOP firms.  In  the  same study,  Quarrey  was also  able  to 
employment record  for  ESOPs alone 
scheme.  The  author  finds  that 
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before  and  after  the  introduction .  .  .in  terms  of  employment  growth  the  ESOP  companies 
grew  5.05%  faster  than  their  comparison  companies  after 
their  ESOPs  compared  to  only  1.2%  faster  before  their 
ESOPS. .  .an  improvement  in  employment growth  of  3.8% 
per  year.  .  .  (p.  29). 
Vbile  these  are  impressive  results,  and  as  sometimes  noted  by  the  authors,  it 
is  dangerous  to  draw too  strong  conclusions  from  these  studies.  There  is  a 
potential  for  bias  resulting  not  only  from  the  selection  of  the  particular  ESOP 
firms  but  also  because  of  the  failure  to  use  an  equivalent  sampling  frame  when 
selecting  both  ESOPs  and  non-ESOPs.  Moreover  one  also  needs  to  know over  how 
many years  these  differences  were  measured  and,  in  particular,  whether  the 
difference  is  sustained  over  a  long  period  after  the  introduction  of  the  HOP. 
For  worker  coops,  the  available  empirical  evidence  is  often  difficult  to 
evaluate.  On the  one  hand,  it  is  apparent  that  (as  elsewhere)  there  has  not 
been  sustained  and massive  job  creation  in  the  worker  coop  sector.  And there 
exist  many examples  of  individual  worker  coops,  that  were  formerly  capitalist 
firms,  soon  perishing  without  any  long-term  job  gains  --  e.g.,  Rath  Packing. 
Sometimes,  as  with  newly  established  coops,  this  reflected  ultimately  doomed 
attempts  to  establish  firms  at  sizes  below  minimum  efficient  scale,  either 
because  of  capital  shortages  or  ideological  preference  for  smallness.  Also  the 
historical  landscape  is  dotted  with  instances  of  what  were  once  flourishing 
coops  disappearing.  In  some  cases,  as  with  the  Minneapolis  cooperages,  it 
seems  that  aging  workers  were  collectively  unable  to  respond  to  rapid  technical 
change  and demand fluctuations  (Jones  (1979)).  At  the  same time  there  are 
conspicuous  success  stories.  For  example,  evaluations  of  the  cost 
effectiveness  of  job-creation  in  worker  coops  are  nearly  all  encouraging  -- 
note,  for  example,  the  low  estimates  for  cost  per  job  created  found  in  extant 
C.S.  worker  owned firms  (e.g.,  Logue,  et  al.).  Also,  during  the  Great 
16 Depression,  in  the  U.S.  worker  coops  were  found  to  be  a  cost-effective  way of 
rehabilitating  the  unemployed  during  times  of  generalized  unemployment  (Jones 
and  Schneider  (1984). 
Most  of  the  econometric  evidence  of  the  effects  of  profit  sharing  and  other 
forms  of  participation  on  productivity  was  obtained  using  data  on  PCs with 
different  patterns  of  participation  in  profits,  ownership,  and  decision 
raking.  However,  there  are  some  exceptions  that  compared  firms  with  some share 
arrangements  and  conventional  firms.  Two of  these  are  reviewed  below.  In 
addition,  we review  some work  that  studied  if  participation  affects  the 
financial  performance  of  firms.  Superior  financial  performances  might  reflect 
higher  productivity. 
Fitzroy  and Kraft  (1986,  1987a,  19873)  investigated  the  effects  of  profit 
sharing  on  (total  factor)  productivity  and  on  the  return  on  assets  (measured  by 
the  ratio  of  cash  flow  to  the  book  value  of  assets).  Their  sample  consisted  of 
two  years  (1977  and 1979)  of  data  on  65  firms  in  the  West  German metal  working 
industry.  They  found  that  both  productivity  (proxied  by  the  residuals  of  a 
Cobb  Douglas  production  function)  and  the  return  on  assets  were  positively 
related  to  profit  sharing,  which  was measured  by  the  profit  share  income  per 
employee.  In  addition,  the  ratio  of  worker  capital  to  total  capital,  a  measure 
of  financial  participation,  had  a  positive  effect  on  both  variables.  In 
contrast,  a  dummy  variable  for  the  existence  of  works  councils,  an  indicator  of 
employee  participation  in  decision-making,  was  negatively  related  to 
productivity.  (Their  equation  for  profitability  did  not  include  the  works 
council  dummy.)  Their  results  suggest  that  performance  is  positively  related 
to  financial  participation  but  negatively  related  to  decision-making 
participation. 
17 Blanchfloner  and Oswald  (1988)  used  the  1984  Workplace  Industrial  Relations 
Survey  to  study  how the  financial  performance  of  firms  was related  to  three 
types  of  profit  related  pay  --  share  ownership,  profit  sharing,  and  a 
value-added  bonus.  All  three  types  of  profit  related  pay  were  represented  by 
dummy  variables.  They  found  that  none  of  the  coefficients  on  the  dummy 
variables  was individually  significant.  (The  coefficients  for  profit  and  value 
added  sharing  were  both  positive  while  the  coefficient  for  employee  share 
ownership  was negative.  1  The main  determinants  of  financial  performance  were 
size  of  the  establishment,  growth  of  demand for  the  firm’s  product,  the 
proportion  of  turnover  accounted  for  by  wages  and  salaries,  and  unionization. 
However,  the  quality  of  the  data  on  financial  performance  (their  measure  was  a 
dummy  variable  indicating  if  the  establishment’s  financial  performance  was 
viewed  by  its  managers to  be  above  average)  suggests  that  one  should  be 
cautious  in  drawing  general  inferences. 
The  remaining  studies  that  we survey  estimated  production  functions  that 
were  augmented by  variables  measuring  various  forms  of  participation.  This 
approach  has  also  been  used  to  investigate  issues  such  as  the  effects  of 
unionization  on  productivity  (see  Brown and Medoff  (1978)). 
Conte  and Svejnar  (1988)  used  a  sample  of  40  U.S.  firms  consisting  of 
profit  sharing  companies,  producer  cooperatives  in  the  plywood  industry,  and 
firms  with  employee  stock  ownership  plans  (ESOPs)  to  investigate  how profit 
sharing  (captured  by  a  dummy  variable),  direct  employee  ownership  and  indirect 
ownership  (i.e.,  through  ESOPs) affect  productivity.  Both  ownership  measures 
were  represented  by  continuous  variables  (indicating  the  percentage  of  the 
company’s  stock  owned by  nonmanagerial  employees)  and  also  captured  by  a  common 
dummy  variable  (indicating  the  absence  of  stock  owriership  by  nonmanagerial 
18 employees).  They found  that  in  most  of  their  results  profit  sharing  did  not 
significantly  affect  productivity.  The  effect  of  employee  ownership  on 
productivity  depended  on  the  proportion  owned by  employees.  A small  ownership 
stake  would  improve  productivity,  while  a  firm  entirely  owned by  its  workers 
would  be  less  productive  than  a  conventional  firm.  However,  as  the  authors 
note,  the  negative  effect  of  direct  ownership  might  reflect  that  plywood  PCs 
were  the  only  firms  in  their  sample  with  a  large  amount of  direct  ownership, 
and  therefore,  their  estimate  of  the  coefficient  on  the  direct  ownership 
variable  might  be  capturing  industry  differences  rather  than  the  effects  of 
participation  in  ownership.  Perhaps  their  most  interesting  result  was  for 
decision-making  participation.  Here  they  found  that  participation  in  decisions 
over  wages  uniformly  had  a  positive  effect  on  productivity,  but  participation 
in  decisions  over  production  is  not  statistically  significant.  However,  their 
sample  was characterized  by  very  little  participation  over  production  so  that 
they  were  not  surprised  that  this  form  of  sharing  did  not  have  an  effect. 
Estrin,  Jones,  and Svejnar  (1987)  estimated  production  functions  for 
producer  cooperatives  in  France,  Italy,  and  the  United  Kingdom using  a  common 
group  of  participatory  variables  as  well  as  other  controls.  Separate 
production  functions  were  estimated  for  each  nation  and  for  industries  or 
sectors  in  each  nation.  Data  on  French  PCs were  for  1978  and  1979  and  covered 
six  industries.  The sample  of  Italian  PCs was  a  panel  data  set  over  the 
1976-80  period  which included  firms  in  both  the  manufacturing  and  construction 
sectors.  The panel  data  on  British  PCs contained  some  50  firms  in  three 
industries  which  were sampled  for  5  year  intervals  between  1948  and  1968.  The 
authors  found  that  the  effects  of  the  various  forms  of  worker  participation 
varied  across  nations  and  industries  as  one  might  expect.  However,  the  various 
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the  net  effect  was positive.  In  general,  profit  sharing  (measured  by  the 
average  surplus  distributed  per  worker)  was  found  to  have  a  positive  effect  on 
productivity.  The amount of  capital  owned per  worker  and worker  participation 
in  decision-making  (proxied  by  the  proportion  of  the  work  force  who are 
members)  had  positive  effects  in  most  cases.  The  percent  of  the  total  capital 
that  is  owned by  the  cooperative  itself  (rather  than  by  individual  members)  was 
found  to  be  statistically  insignificant  or  to  have  a  negative  effect.  Finally, 
worker  loans  did  not  have  a  statistically  significant  effect.  Thus,  the  effect 
of  different  forms  of  participation  differ  and  they  vary  across  institutional 
settings. 
Jones  (1987)  studied  the  productivity  effects  of  financial  participation 
and  a  particular  form of  participation  in  decision-making  --  worker 
representation  on  the  board  of  directors  --  in  a  sample  of  50  British  retail 
cooperatives  for  1978.  The  data  set  contains  both  coops  in  which  many workers 
are  members and directors  and  other  coops  that  exclude  workers  from 
membership.  Although  the  latter  co-ops  are  still  legally  owned by  consumers, 
they  are,  from  the  standpoint  of  their  employees,  no  different  from  private 
companies.  He finds  that  the  presence  of  worker  directors  modestly  increases 
productivity,  whereas,  surprisingly,  financial  participation  in  the  firm  by 
employees  reduces  productivity.  Unlike  other  financial  participation 
variables,  profit  sharing  (measured  by  the  dividend  distributed  per  member) had 
a  positive  but  statistically  insignificant  impact  on  productivity.  The net 
impact  on  productivity  of  both  forms  of  participation  is  small  but  positive. 
Returning  to  the  U.S.  one  of  the  first  major  studies  was  by  Conte  and 
Tannenbaum (reported  in  1978,  19801.’  For  a  sample  of  98  firms  with  employee 
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ownership  had higher  profits  relative  to  companies  with  less  employee 
ownership.  An attempt  was made to  control  for  the  effect  of  worker 
participation  in  decision-making:  this  factor  was  not  found  to  be  associated 
with  higher  relative  profits.  While  the  authors  concluded  that  their  findings 
were  suggestive  of  a  link  between  employee  ownership  and profitability,  the 
limitations  that  often  handicap  pioneering  studies,  e.g.,  a  small  sample  that 
is  probably  subject  to  selection  bias  and  a  crude  measure  of  de  jure 
participation  --  necessarily  mean that  one  must  be  very  cautious  in  accepting 
this  conclusion. 
More recent  empirical  studies  include  Tannenbaum  et  al.  (19841,  which  is  a 
follow-up  to  the  Conte-Tannenbaum study  of  1978  and  Conte  et  al.  (1981).  The 
new  study  included  55  companies  from  Tannenbaum’s  1981  study  as  part  of  a  total 
of  115  employee  owned firms.  In  this  study  the  employee-ownership  companies 
were  matched  with  99  comparable,  traditionally  owned firms.  Response  rates 
were  impressively  high  and  average  about  60%.  No evidence  of  higher 
profitability  in  the  employee-ownership  companies  was  found. 
With  a  sample  of  229  companies,  Harsh and McAllister  (1981)  ostensibly  have 
a  bigger  sample  than  the  original  study  of  Conte  and  Tannenbaum.  However,  for 
their  productivity  analysis,  they  obtained  a  response  rate  of  only  15%,  whereas 
Conte  and Tannenbaum  had  30  out  of  98  respondents  on  this  question.  Insofar  as 
coops  are  excluded,  the  Harsh  and  McAllister  samples  of  employee  owned firms  is 
more  homogeneous.  However,  since  only  28  out  of  211  have  majority  employee 
ownership,  the  average  firm  will  have  a  very  low  degree  of  employee  ownership. 
Consequently,  the  subjects  of  this  study  are  very  different  than  that  of  the 
Conte-Tannenbaum study.  Using  labor  productivity  as  an  indicator  of  enterprise 
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productivity  over  their  study  period  at  a  rate  of  0.78%  per  year,  while  in 
comparable  non-ESOP  firms  it  declined  by  0.74%  per  year. 
Since  the  study  by  Livingstone  and  Henry  (1980)  claims  to  look  only  at 
ESOPs, on  the  face  of  things  it  deals  with  firms  similar  to  those  examined  by 
Marsh and McAllister.  But  since  their  study  focuses  exclusively  on  firms 
established  before  ‘1966,  they  are,  in  fact,  dealing  yet  again  with  quite  a 
different  type  of  employee  owned firm.  In  fact,  since  the  federal  ESOP  program 
did  not  originate  until  1974  they  cannot  possibly  be  dealing  with  ESOPs.  Most 
likely  their  sample  comprises  direct  ownership  employee  stock  purchase  plans. 
Hence  the  finding  of  Livingston  and  Henry  that  “ESOP” companies  were  less 
profitable  relative  to  matched  non-ESOP companies  does  not  necessarily 
contradict  these  findings  from  other  studies:  in  fact,  the  studies  are 
examining  quite  different  entities. 
Two of  the  better  and more  recent  studies  that  examine  the  issue  of  the 
performance  of  employee  owned companies,  are  Quarrey  (1986)  and  GAO (198718. 
When growth  in  sales  is  used  as  the  index  of  performance,  Quarrey  finds  that 
ESOP firms  significantly  outperform  conventional  firms,  and  that  ESOP  sample 
enterprises  dramatically  improve  their  performance  after  the  plan  is  introduced 
compared  to  the  pre  ESOP  period.  Importantly  he  finds  that  employee  ownership 
is  more  effective  when worker  participation  is  also  present.  In  the  GAO  study 
(see  also  the  chapter  in  this  volume  by  Eanford  and  Granof,  however,  employee 
ownership  alone  does  not  appear  to  be  associated  with  improved  corporate 
performance.  But as  with  Quarrey’s  study,  there  is  some evidence  that 
participation  by  employees  in  “shop  floor”  decisions  and processes  is 
associated  with  enhanced  productivity. 
22 There  has  been  little  econometric  work  done  on  the  effects  of  sharing  on 
investment.  Blanchflower  and  Oswald  (198’7b)  found  that  employee  share 
ownership  schemes did  not  have  a  statistically  significant  effect  on 
investment.  (See  our  discussion  of  their  work  on  employment above  for  a 
description  of  their  sample.)  Since  this  finding  was  based  on  qualitative 
investment  data  (that  only  indicated  if  investment  had  been  increasing, 
constant,  or  decreasing  over  the  previous  two  or  three  years),  one  should  view 
the  general  applicability  of  their  result  with  caution. 
As  we discussed  in  section  II,  the  conventional  wisdom  is  that  PCs will 
underinvest.  Estrin  and  Jones  (1988)  investigated  this  hypothesis  using  data 
on  French  producer  cooperatives.  They  estimated  two  models.  The  first  used  a 
cross  section  of  PCs in  1979.  The  second  used  a  panel  of  PCs over  the  period 
1970-1979.  For  both  models,  they  found  that  investment  was  explained  by  the 
firm’s  cash  flow  and  by  changes  in  value  added  (i.e.,  an  accelerator  effect); 
their  proxies  for  the  factors  that  theorists  identified  as  the  causes  of 
underinvestment  did  not  loner  investment.  As  the  authors  point  out,  their 
failure  to  confirm  the  underinvestment  hypothesis  might  be  explained  by 
institutional  features  of  the  French  PC sector  that  would  offset  the  tendency 
of  PCs to  invest  less  than  conventional  firms. 
When we  turn  to  the  empirical  evidence  on  income  and  wealth  distribution  so 
far  as  internal  wage  structures  are  concerned,  in  the  U.S.  there  are  important 
examples  of  earnings  differentials  within  worker  coops  deliberately  being  kept 
within  bounds  that  are  narrower  than  found  in  comparable  capitalist  firms  -- 
e.g.,  plywood  coops  in  the  U.S.  Turning  to  the  effects  of  ESOPs on  the 
distribution  of  wealth,  a  study  of  140  ESOP  companies  (NCEO, 1985)  calculated 
23 that 
.an  employee  earning  the  1983  median  wage of 
il8,OOO  per  year  would  accumulate  over  $31,000  of 
stock  in  the  average  ESOP  in  ten  years,  .  .  .and 
$124,000  in  20  years. 
Men  this  is  compared with  the  estimated  median  net  financial  assets  of  a 
family  at  retirement  age  of  about  $11,000,  then  it  seems  reasonable  to  conclude 
that  ESOPs  do  contain  great  potential  for  broadening  the  ownership  of  wealth. 
However,  in  a  more recent  study  of  1,113  ESOPs established  between  1979  and 
1983  (U.  S.  General  Accounting  Office,  1986a,  p.231,  it  is  found  that  the 
actual  median  accumulation  is  only  $5,226  and  that  the  arithmetic  average  is 
about  $2,600  per  participant.  That  is,  the  growth  of  ESOPs in  the  U.S.  had  not 
as  yet  led  to  the  accumulation  of  significant  capital  holdings  by  the  average 
employee  in  an ESOP  firm. 
Finally  and briefly  we turn  to  the  evidence  on  life  cycles  and  survival, 
the  evidence  for  which  is  mostly  for  PCs.  On the  face  of  things  the  American 
experience  does  not  support  an  optimistic  view  of  the  ability  of  coops  to 
survive  (Russell  (1985) 1.  However,  there  are  cases  of  U.S.  coops  surviving  for 
more  than  one  generation  (Jones  (1979))  and  for  British  PCs,  Jones  (1975)  finds 
that  not  only  can  they  survive  but  they  may survive  for  periods  longer  than  for 
comparable  capitalist  institutions.  Eore  generally,  Ben-Ner  (1988)  finds  that 
for  worker-owned  firms  in  several  countries,  overall  they  suffer  a  lower  risk 
of  demise  than  do  capitalist  firms. 
Batton  (1988)  investigated  which  factors  contributed  to  the  ability  of 
profit  sharing  schemes to  survive.  His  sample  consisted  of  258  British  firms 
that  introduced  profit  sharing  between  1865  and  1913.  His  estimated  survival 
functions  (technically,  proportional  hazard  models)  indicate  that  the  type  of 
scheme  affected  the  probability  that  the  scheme  survived:  cash  bonus  schemes 
were  more  likely  to  survive  than  schemes  including  some degree  of  share 
24 ownership. 
The  most  comprehensive  and  reliable  available  evidence  on  life  cycles 
(Estrin  and  Jones  (198611,  while  revealing  a  life  cycle  process  for  coops, 
indicates  one  that  is  rather  different  than  envisaged  by  the  theory  of  Ben-Ner 
(1984)  ;  Miyazaki  (1984)  1.  The  life  cycle  process  for  French  producer  coops 
neither  stresses  nor  conforms  with  in  any  systematic  way  the  variables  given 
pride  of  place  by  theorists  in  this  area  --  pay,  productivity  and 
worker-membership  ratios.  Importantly,  tests  on  a  large  panel  data  set  for  a 
negative  association  between  earnings  and  the  worker-member  ratio,  other  things 
equal,  yields  findings  that  are  not  consistent  with  current  economic  theory. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
Our  partial  survey  of  recent  econometric  work  on  the  effects  of  worker 
participation,  employee  share  ownership,  and  profit  sharing  indicates  that 
alternative  organizational  structures  and  labor  compensation  systems  often 
affect  the  economic  performance  of  firms.  However,  and  especially  for  studies 
of  firms  that  are  primarily  profit  sharing,  we  sometimes  find  that  studies 
obtained  conflicting  results.  For  many  studies,  in  part  this  reflects  the 
effects  of  participatory  arrangements  which  vary  across  institutional  settings, 
including  the  various  forms  of  participation  that  characterize  the  firm.  It  is 
also  clear  that  many  studies,  as  with  those  for  U.S.  ESOPs,  suffer  for  a 
variety  of  reasons  so  that  one  is  hesitant  to  accept  their  findings  in 
general.  Not  only  are  there  problems  posed  by  the  diversity  of  alternative 
sharing  arrangements,  but  also,  without  careful  planning  studies  will  likely 
suffer  from  selection  bias,  inappropriate  sampling  frames  and  possibly 
insufficiently  long-lasting  panels  of  data.  In  addition,  there  are  often 
25 crucial  measurement problems.  Frequently  the  particular  measure  of 
participation  that  is  used  is  quite  inadequate  and  does  not  directly  capture 
attitudinal  or  behavioral  characteristics.  Sometimes  the  particular  measure  of 
“performance”  has  been  chosen  rather  arbitrarily,  and  not  derived  from  an 
explicit  theoretical  framework.  Moreover,  the  particular  statistical  analysis 
used  in  many studies  is  seldom  motivated  by  a  well-reasoned  empirical  strategy. 
In  view  of  the  several  shortcomings  of  the  available  evidence  it  is  a 
hazardous  undertaking  trying  to  derive  definitive  conclusions  on  the  particular 
economic  effects  from  this  preliminary  work.  Clearly  much more  research  on  all 
of  these  issues  and for  the  various  forms  of  sharing  is  needed.  This  is 
perhaps  especially  the  case  for  all  issues  except  the  effects  of  sharing 
schemes  on  company performance.  Sufficient  work has  been  done  on  that  matter 
so  that  it  does  seem reasonable  to  conclude  from  the  available  research  that 
normally,  at  worst  employee  ownership  and  worker  participation  schemes  will 
have  a  neutral  effect,  and  in  many cases  they  will  improve  performance.  The 
particular  result  depends  on  the  specific  characteristics  of  the  particular 
scheme.  The available  evidence  is  strongly  suggestive  that  for  employee 
ownership  schemes  to  have  a  strong  positive  impact  they  need  to  be  accompanied 
by  provision  for  worker  participation  in  decision-making. 
26 NOTES 
ISuch  a  survey  is  necessarily  selective.  For  earlier  work  see  the  essays 
in  Jones  and  Svejnar  (eds.)  (19821,  and  the  surveys  in  Ireland  and  Law  (19821. 
ZNote,  however,  that  this  result  is  dependent  on  the  choice  of  the 
particular  maximand.  (Se2  Bonin  and  Putterman,  1986). 
3This  pessimistic  conclusion  is  similar  to  that  reached  earlier  by  the 
Webbs  (1920). 
40ft2n  the  conclusions  d2rived  from  studies  which  us2  other  techniques  to 
examine  aspects  of  performance  are  less  reliable  than  those  based  on 
econometric  analysis.  For  example,  studies  which  use  ratio  analysis  to  compare 
productivity  in  sharing  and  non-sharing  firms,  often  are  unable  to  control  for 
important  variables  (e.g.,  capital  stock)  that  affect  performance.  Also  such 
studies  are  restricted  to  comparisons  of  performance  on  average. 
5Usable  data  on  many  of  the  firms  exist  for  at  least  20  years.  Thus, 
some  of  the  authors’  econometric  results  are  based  on  over  3000  observations. 
60n  the  basis  of  conventional  t-tests  for  differences  in  population  means 
for  a  variety  of  measures  of  performance,  Cable  (1988,  p.  129)  concluded  that 
profit  sharing  and  participation  in  decision-making  “are  essentially  different 
phenomena,  typically  used  by  different  kinds  of  firms  in  different 
circumstances,  they  may  well  not  mix.” 
7For  a  more  comprehensive  review  of  these  studies,  see  the  Appendix  of 
U.S.,  G.A.O.  (1987). 
8The  part  of  the  GAO study  that  examines  the  relationship  between 
enterprise  performance  and  worker  participation  in  ESOP firm  is  examined  in  the 
chapter  by  Hanford  and  Grazzo  in  this  volume. 
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